docs(theory): provenance threat model (foundational doc for Step 2)#90
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Closes #25. Until now the provenance chain's value proposition lived only in the README ("tamper-evident SHA-256 hash chain so you can prove who did what and when") with no written model of what that actually proves under which adversary. The V-L2-C* implementation issues just made multiple binding decisions (which fields to hash, how to encode the timestamp, whether self-loops are allowed) that all need a single reference; this is it. `docs/theory/provenance-threat-model.adoc` covers the five sections required by V-L1-B1: 1. Four adversary models — read-only, sidecar-append, sidecar-rewrite, clock-skew (the last is orthogonal and can compose with any of the first three). 2. What the chain proves under each, field-by-field and with the specific "defeated by" pathway for each gap. Explicit about where the chain provides zero protection (sidecar-rewrite locally) and where it conditionally protects (sidecar-append against forged actor only if signatures are added). 3. Five out-of-scope items: DoS, side channels, target-DB tampering bypassing interception, retroactive provenance, identity binding. 4. Five assumptions: sidecar locality, optional append-only storage layer, SHA-256 strength, clock source, single writer. 5. Four open questions, each marked as a future ADR (per-entry signatures, external anchoring, trusted clock policy, snapshot redaction). Cross-references the V-L2-C1..C4 implementation and points at the specific source files where the relevant invariants live. No code changes; doc-only. Future ADR-0004 (the "binding choices" ADR called for in this issue's acceptance criteria) is a follow-up once this doc is reviewed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Per V-L1-B1: the provenance chain's value proposition lived only in the README. The V-L2-C* implementation issues just made multiple binding decisions (which fields to hash, how to encode the timestamp, whether self-loops are allowed) that need a single reference. This is that reference.
docs/theory/provenance-threat-model.adoccovers:actoronly if signatures are added).Cross-references V-L2-C1..C4 (just merged in #88) and points at the specific source files for each relevant invariant.
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Test plan
docs/theory/provenance-threat-model.adocwith all five required sectionssrc/abi/mod.rs::ProvenanceEntry, etc.)Doc-only; no code changes.