| Version | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
0.x |
active | Receives all security fixes. |
The 1.0 release will define a long-term-support window. Until then, only the
latest 0.x minor is supported.
If you believe you have found a security vulnerability in this package, please do not file a public GitHub issue. Instead, email security@blocksign.ink with:
- A description of the vulnerability and its impact.
- Steps to reproduce, including a minimal proof of concept where possible.
- Your name and contact information, if you would like credit in the advisory.
We aim to:
- Acknowledge your report within 3 business days.
- Provide a preliminary assessment within 7 business days.
- Issue a fix and coordinated advisory within 90 days for high-severity issues, or sooner for actively exploited issues.
In scope:
- Bugs in
blocksign-verifythat cause averifiedverdict to be returned for a tampered document, or atamperedverdict for an untampered one. - Bugs in stamp deserialization that allow attacker-controlled bytes to reach unsafe code paths (prototype pollution, RCE via dependency, etc.).
- Logic errors that allow a verifier to be tricked into reading the wrong Solana memo for a given PDF.
Out of scope:
- The XOR obfuscation step is not a confidentiality primitive. Reports
that the protocol key is public, or that on-chain stamp metadata can be
read by anyone, are not vulnerabilities — they are protocol design (see
docs/PROTOCOL.md). - Denial-of-service against a self-hosted verifier process by passing oversized inputs.
- Vulnerabilities in transitive dependencies that are not exploitable through this package's API.
We will work with you on a disclosure timeline that gives users time to upgrade. We prefer to publish a GitHub Security Advisory and request a CVE ID once a fix is available.