Update dependency com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core to v2.18.6 [SECURITY]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core	2.3.2 → 2.18.6

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GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2025-49128

Overview

A flaw in Jackson-core's JsonLocation._appendSourceDesc method allows up to 500 bytes of unintended memory content to be included in exception messages. When parsing JSON from a byte array with an offset and length, the exception message incorrectly reads from the beginning of the array instead of the logical payload start. This results in possible information disclosure in systems using pooled or reused buffers, like Netty or Vert.x.

Details

The vulnerability affects the creation of exception messages like:

JsonParseException: Unexpected character ... at [Source: (byte[])...]

When JsonFactory.createParser(byte[] data, int offset, int len) is used, and an error occurs while parsing, the exception message should include a snippet from the specified logical payload. However, the method _appendSourceDesc ignores the offset, and always starts reading from index 0.

If the buffer contains residual sensitive data from a previous request, such as credentials or document contents, that data may be exposed if the exception is propagated to the client.

The issue particularly impacts server applications using:

• Pooled byte buffers (e.g., Netty)
• Frameworks that surface parse errors in HTTP responses
• Default Jackson settings (i.e., INCLUDE_SOURCE_IN_LOCATION is enabled)

A documented real-world example is CVE-2021-22145 in Elasticsearch, which stemmed from the same root cause.

Attack Scenario

An attacker sends malformed JSON to a service using Jackson and pooled byte buffers (e.g., Netty-based HTTP servers). If the server reuses a buffer and includes the parser’s exception in its HTTP 400 response, the attacker may receive residual data from previous requests.

Proof of Concept

byte[] buffer = new byte[1000];
System.arraycopy("SECRET".getBytes(), 0, buffer, 0, 6);
System.arraycopy("{ \"bad\": }".getBytes(), 0, buffer, 700, 10);

JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();
JsonParser parser = factory.createParser(buffer, 700, 20);
parser.nextToken(); // throws exception

// Exception message will include "SECRET"

Patches

This issue was silently fixed in jackson-core version 2.13.0, released on September 30, 2021, via PR #​652.

All users should upgrade to version 2.13.0 or later.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, applications can mitigate the issue by:

1. Disabling exception message exposure to clients — avoid returning parsing exception messages in HTTP responses.

2. Disabling source inclusion in exceptions by setting:

   jsonFactory.disable(JsonFactory.Feature.INCLUDE_SOURCE_IN_LOCATION);

   This prevents Jackson from embedding any source content in exception messages, avoiding leakage.

References

• Pull Request #​652 (Fix implementation)
• CVE-2021-22145 (Elasticsearch exposure of this flaw)

CVE-2025-52999

Impact

With older versions of jackson-core, if you parse an input file and it has deeply nested data, Jackson could end up throwing a StackoverflowError if the depth is particularly large.

Patches

jackson-core 2.15.0 contains a configurable limit for how deep Jackson will traverse in an input document, defaulting to an allowable depth of 1000. Change is in https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/943. jackson-core will throw a StreamConstraintsException if the limit is reached.
jackson-databind also benefits from this change because it uses jackson-core to parse JSON inputs.

Workarounds

Users should avoid parsing input files from untrusted sources.

GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq

Summary

The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in jackson-core bypasses the maxNumberLength constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in StreamReadConstraints. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).

The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.

Details

The root cause is that the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.

• The number parsing methods (e.g., _finishNumberIntegralPart) accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length checks.
• After parsing, they call _valueComplete(), which finalizes the token but does not call resetInt() or resetFloat().
• The resetInt()/resetFloat() methods in ParserBase are where the validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() checks are performed.
• Because this validation step is skipped, the maxNumberLength constraint is never enforced in the async code path.

PoC

The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.

package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;

import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;

import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;

import tools.jackson.core.*;
import tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
import tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;

import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;

/**
 * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers
 *
 * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos
 * 
 * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).
 * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.
 *
 * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where
 * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls
 * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.
 *
 * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
 */
class AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {

    private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;
    private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;

    private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();

    // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength
    @​Test
    void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
		
		// Output to console
        System.out.println("[SYNC] Parsing " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number (limit: " + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + ")");
        try {
            try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {
                while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                    if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                        System.out.println("[SYNC] Accepted number with " + p.getText().length() + " digits — UNEXPECTED");
                    }
                }
            }
            fail("Sync parser must reject a " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            System.out.println("[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: " + e.getMessage());
        }
    }

    // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects
    @​Test
    void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);

        NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =
            (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());
        p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);
        p.endOfInput();

        boolean foundNumber = false;
        try {
            while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                    foundNumber = true;
                    String numberText = p.getText();
                    assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),
                        "Async parser silently accepted all " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits");
                }
            }
            // Output to console
            System.out.println("[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits — BUG CONFIRMED");
            assertTrue(foundNumber, "Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            fail("Bug is fixed — async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: " + e.getMessage());
        }
        p.close();
    }

    private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {
        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);
        sb.append("{\"v\":");
        for (int i = 0; i < numDigits; i++) {
            sb.append((char) ('1' + (i % 9)));
        }
        sb.append('}');
        return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
    }
}

Impact

A malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:

1. Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation of memory in the TextBuffer to store the number's digits, leading to an OutOfMemoryError.
2. CPU Exhaustion: If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.

Suggested Remediation

The async parsing path should be updated to respect the maxNumberLength constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that _valueComplete() or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (resetInt() or resetFloat()) already present in ParserBase, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.

NOTE: This research was performed in collaboration with rohan-repos

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