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Security: P4suta/afm

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

If you discover a security vulnerability in afm — a parser crash on untrusted input, a memory-safety issue, an HTML-injection bypass, or anything with exploitative potential — do not open a public issue. Instead:

  1. Preferred: open a private report via GitHub Security Advisories. This lets us discuss and patch before disclosure.
  2. Alternative: email the maintainer at 42543015+P4suta@users.noreply.github.com with the subject [afm security] <short summary>.

Please include:

  • The shortest input or reproduction steps that trigger the issue.
  • The afm version / commit hash and the Rust toolchain version.
  • Whether the issue is reachable via untrusted input (e.g. rendering user-supplied markdown).
  • Your proposed CVSS severity, if you have one in mind.

Response expectations

  • We acknowledge reports within 7 days.
  • Triage, patch, and coordinated disclosure typically complete within 30–60 days for high-severity issues, faster for critical ones.
  • Credits (unless you prefer anonymity) are noted in CHANGELOG.md and the security advisory.

Scope

In scope:

  • Crashes, panics, or non-termination on any UTF-8 or Shift_JIS input within 10 MiB.
  • HTML-escape bypass in the renderer (the splice surface in crates/afm-markdown/src/post_process.rs and the upstream per-node writer in sibling aozora-render), since rendered output is embedded in web pages.
  • CommonMark / GFM conformance regressions that enable a bypass.
  • Integer overflow, out-of-bounds reads (we #![forbid(unsafe_code)] in our own crates; upstream/comrak/ is unsafe-free too).

Out of scope:

  • Bugs in vendored upstream/comrak/ that also reproduce against pristine comrak at the same tag — please report those upstream at https://github.com/kivikakk/comrak.
  • Denial-of-service via inputs that simply take a long time to parse without panicking (we track these as perf issues, not vulns).
  • Issues in dependencies with no afm-specific exploitation path — cargo-deny's advisory check catches these at CI time.

Supported versions

afm is pre-1.0. Only the main branch is supported; security fixes land there and in the next tagged release.

Version Supported
main
<1.0 ❌ (use main)

There aren't any published security advisories