Security: Prevent zip slip during archive extraction#5112
Draft
RishabhJain2018 wants to merge 2 commits into
Draft
Security: Prevent zip slip during archive extraction#5112RishabhJain2018 wants to merge 2 commits into
RishabhJain2018 wants to merge 2 commits into
Conversation
Validate zip member paths before extractall in the API, config utilities, and submission workers so archives cannot write outside the target directory. Co-authored-by: Rishabh Jain <rishabhjain2018@gmail.com>
|
No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. 🎉 ℹ️ Recent review info⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: Path: .coderabbit.yaml Review profile: CHILL Plan: Pro Plus Run ID: 📒 Files selected for processing (5)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (4)
WalkthroughThis PR hardens ZIP extraction security by introducing a centralized path-traversal validation utility and routing all ZIP extractions through it. A new ChangesZIP Extraction Path-Traversal Security
Estimated code review effort🎯 2 (Simple) | ⏱️ ~10 minutes Possibly related issues
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✏️ Tip: You can configure your own custom pre-merge checks in the settings. ✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
Comment |
![coderabbitai[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/347564?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Actionable comments posted: 3
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
In `@apps/base/utils.py`:
- Around line 503-517: The ZIP extraction is protected but YAML-sourced paths
can still traverse out of the extracted tree; add a helper (e.g.,
safe_join_under_root(root, *parts)) that resolves and verifies the final path is
inside root (similar check to safe_extract_zip_file), then replace every place
that builds filesystem paths from YAML values (references to description,
evaluation_details, terms_and_conditions, submission_guidelines,
evaluation_script, test_annotation_file) to call
safe_join_under_root(extracted_root, yaml_value) before any
os.path.isfile/open/stat calls; ensure the helper raises on unsafe targets and
is used everywhere YAML-derived values are passed to isfile() or open().
In `@apps/challenges/challenge_config_utils.py`:
- Around line 96-103: The extract_zip_file function currently opens
zipfile.ZipFile(file_path, mode) into zip_ref and calls
safe_extract_zip_file(zip_ref, output_path) but only calls zip_ref.close() after
that, so if safe_extract_zip_file raises the handle remains open; wrap the
extraction call in a try/finally (or use a context manager) so zip_ref.close()
is always executed, i.e., ensure zip_ref is closed in the finally block even on
exceptions and return only after closing; reference symbols: extract_zip_file,
safe_extract_zip_file, zipfile.ZipFile, zip_ref.close().
In `@scripts/workers/remote_submission_worker.py`:
- Around line 137-140: The import of safe_extract_zip_file at module top-level
causes apps/base/utils.py (with Django/DRF top-level imports) to execute and
crash this worker; to fix, remove the top-level line "from base.utils import
safe_extract_zip_file" and instead perform a lazy/local import inside the
function that uses it (the code around zip_ref =
zipfile.ZipFile(download_location, "r") and safe_extract_zip_file(zip_ref,
extract_location)), or refactor safe_extract_zip_file into a small standalone
helper module with no Django dependencies and import that helper here; update
references to use the newly imported/local function name so extraction occurs
without importing Django during module import.
🪄 Autofix (Beta)
Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
- Push a commit to this branch (recommended)
- Create a new PR with the fixes
ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: Path: .coderabbit.yaml
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro Plus
Run ID: dd256f7a-b836-45ba-9cb2-0e94968634f5
📒 Files selected for processing (5)
apps/base/utils.pyapps/challenges/challenge_config_utils.pyapps/challenges/views.pyscripts/workers/remote_submission_worker.pyscripts/workers/submission_worker.py
Comment on lines
+503
to
+517
| def safe_extract_zip_file(zip_ref, destination): | ||
| """ | ||
| Extract zip archive members while preventing path traversal (zip slip). | ||
| """ | ||
| destination_path = os.path.abspath(destination) | ||
| for member in zip_ref.namelist(): | ||
| member_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(destination_path, member)) | ||
| if not ( | ||
| member_path == destination_path | ||
| or member_path.startswith(destination_path + os.sep) | ||
| ): | ||
| raise zipfile.BadZipFile( | ||
| "Zip archive contains unsafe file paths." | ||
| ) | ||
| zip_ref.extractall(destination_path) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
This still leaves a traversal path via YAML-referenced files.
safe_extract_zip_file() only validates archive member paths. In the challenge import flows, the extracted YAML is still used to build paths for files like description, evaluation_details, terms_and_conditions, submission_guidelines, evaluation_script, and test_annotation_file with plain join(..., yaml_value) calls. A config value containing ../ can still escape the extracted tree and turn this into an arbitrary file read even though extraction itself is now bounded. Please add a shared safe_join_under_root()-style helper and use it everywhere a YAML value becomes a filesystem path.
🔐 Suggested direction
+def safe_join_under_root(root, relative_path):
+ candidate = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(root, relative_path))
+ if not (
+ candidate == root
+ or candidate.startswith(root + os.sep)
+ ):
+ raise ValueError("Path escapes extraction root.")
+ return candidateUse that helper before every isfile() / open() on YAML-derived paths.
As per coding guidelines, apps/**: Django backend. Pay attention to: Safe handling of user-submitted files and Docker image references.
📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
Suggested change
| def safe_extract_zip_file(zip_ref, destination): | |
| """ | |
| Extract zip archive members while preventing path traversal (zip slip). | |
| """ | |
| destination_path = os.path.abspath(destination) | |
| for member in zip_ref.namelist(): | |
| member_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(destination_path, member)) | |
| if not ( | |
| member_path == destination_path | |
| or member_path.startswith(destination_path + os.sep) | |
| ): | |
| raise zipfile.BadZipFile( | |
| "Zip archive contains unsafe file paths." | |
| ) | |
| zip_ref.extractall(destination_path) | |
| def safe_extract_zip_file(zip_ref, destination): | |
| """ | |
| Extract zip archive members while preventing path traversal (zip slip). | |
| """ | |
| destination_path = os.path.abspath(destination) | |
| for member in zip_ref.namelist(): | |
| member_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(destination_path, member)) | |
| if not ( | |
| member_path == destination_path | |
| or member_path.startswith(destination_path + os.sep) | |
| ): | |
| raise zipfile.BadZipFile( | |
| "Zip archive contains unsafe file paths." | |
| ) | |
| zip_ref.extractall(destination_path) | |
| def safe_join_under_root(root, relative_path): | |
| candidate = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(root, relative_path)) | |
| if not ( | |
| candidate == root | |
| or candidate.startswith(root + os.sep) | |
| ): | |
| raise ValueError("Path escapes extraction root.") | |
| return candidate |
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
In `@apps/base/utils.py` around lines 503 - 517, The ZIP extraction is protected
but YAML-sourced paths can still traverse out of the extracted tree; add a
helper (e.g., safe_join_under_root(root, *parts)) that resolves and verifies the
final path is inside root (similar check to safe_extract_zip_file), then replace
every place that builds filesystem paths from YAML values (references to
description, evaluation_details, terms_and_conditions, submission_guidelines,
evaluation_script, test_annotation_file) to call
safe_join_under_root(extracted_root, yaml_value) before any
os.path.isfile/open/stat calls; ensure the helper raises on unsafe targets and
is used everywhere YAML-derived values are passed to isfile() or open().
Move safe_extract_zip_file into base.zip_utils for workers without Django setup and close zip handles on extraction failure.
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
2 participants
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
Mitigates zip slip (path traversal) when extracting challenge and submission archives.
Changes
safe_extract_zip_file()inapps/base/utils.pyto validate member paths before extraction.Security impact
Prevents malicious zip archives from writing files outside the intended extraction directory.
Slack Thread
Summary by CodeRabbit